報(bào)告信息：

主 題：Stable matching: An integer programming approach

主講人：黃超 博士

報(bào)告內(nèi)容摘要：This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious continuum market induced from the original matching market. Each stable integral matching of the continuum market corresponds to a stable matching of the original matching market. We show that a stable matching exists in the original matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Our result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.

主持人：焦振華 教授

時(shí) 間：2021年5月14日（星期五）13：30-15:00

地 點(diǎn)：上海對(duì)外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)博識(shí)樓113會(huì)議室

主講人簡(jiǎn)介：

黃超，上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，南京審計(jì)大學(xué)社會(huì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院潤(rùn)澤學(xué)者，主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)椋何⒂^(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、市場(chǎng)設(shè)計(jì)理論、匹配理論；論文發(fā)表于Games and Economic Behavior，Social Choice and Welfare等。

This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a real-life market when firms’ preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Contrary to common blief, this result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.